[TIE  RUSSIAN  PROBLEM 


PAUL  VINOGRADOFF  F  BA. 


/ 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

GIFT  OF 


Gul 


THE   RUSSIAN   PROBLEM 


THE 

RUSSIAN    PROBLEM 


BY 

PAUL    VINOGRADOFF.    F.B.A. 

CORPUS    PROFESSOR    OF   JURISPRUDENCE    IN    THE    UNIVERSITY 

OF    OXFORD,    SOMETIME    PROFESSOR    OF    HISTORY    IN 

THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    MOSCOW 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 
Edinburgh  :  T.  and  A.  Constable,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 


JDKt 

17* 


Great  events  have  been  crowded  into  the 
space  of  a  few  weeks,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
regain  one's  balance  in  the  rush  of  unexpected 
experiences.  Every  one  feels  that  there  is  a 
background  to  all  these  '  events '  in  the  shape 
of  4  conditions,'  and  that  what  is  happening 
now  is  only  a  manifestation  of  latent  forces 
gathered  long  before  the  collision. 

One  of  the  popular  surprises  of  the  war 
has  been  the  gigantic  strength  of  Russia, 
and  the  public  spirit  which  animates  her  in 
this  crisis.  The  fact  that  German  statesmen 
and  military  leaders  entirely  miscalculated 
these  forces,  in  spite  or  because  of  the  close 
neighbourhood  of  both  countries,  is  casting 
ridicule  on  the  pedantic  conceit  of  the  chosen 
Kultur-people. 

But  if  '  conditions '  have  been  of  great 
importance  in  the  war,  their  study  will  repay 


549443 


vi  THE  RUSSIAN  PROBLEM 

attention  when  the  war  is  over  and  the 
immediate  occasion  for  explaining  surprising 
facts  has  passed.  The  operation  of  latent 
forces  is  sure  to  make  itself  felt  again  and 
again  in  the  future. 

The  weight  of  such  considerations  seems  to 
be  realised  at  the  present  time  by  the  British 
public.  A  remarkable  characteristic  of  the 
literature  which  has  sprung  up  in  such  exu- 
berant growth  in  regard  to  the  war,  has  been 
that  it  is  primarily  directed  to  account  for 
latent  forces  and  conditions. 

Personally  I  have  had  numberless  inquiries 
from  friends  and  from  strangers  about  the 
state  of  Russia,  her  prospects,  her  chances 
of  peaceful  and  progressive  development. 
English  public  opinion  finds  it  naturally 
difficult  to  readjust  its  estimates  :  it  is  not 
very  long  since  the  hatchet  has  been  buried 
between  the  two  countries,  and,  besides,  there 
are  many  traits  about  the  present  political 
situation  in  Russia  which  rightly  shock  people 
in  the  West.  But  thoughtful  observers  under- 
stand that  it  is  not  this  or  the  other  action  of 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE  vii 

the  government  that  matters,  but  the  general 
evolution  of  the  nation. 

It  is  felt  more  and  more  that  a  decisive 
transformation  is  taking  place  in  the  Eastern 
Empire,  that  the  effects  of  this  transformation 
are  already  apparent  on  all  sides,  and  that  its 
general  result  is  a  foregone  conclusion,  in  the 
sense  of  progress  from  arbitrary  methods 
towards  the  rule  of  law. 

The  two  modest  contributions  to  the  elucida- 
tion of  the  great  problem,  which  are  offered 
in  the  present  instance,  are  intended  rather  to 
raise  questions  than  to  solve  them,  rather  to 
point  out  certain  directions  of  thought  than 
to  treat  of  the  subject  in  a  consecutive  manner. 
A  larger  book  may  come  later  on,  but  I  thought 
that  even  a  lecture  and  a  letter  on  the  great 
problem  would  not  be  superfluous  by  way  of 
introduction  to  such  a  book.  I  have  been 
led  to  this  assumption  partly  by  the  very 
cordial  reception  which  was  given  me  when 
I  delivered  the  lecture  published  now  under 
the  heading  4  Russia  after  the  War,'  at  Sheffield 
and  at  Nottingham,  to  large  popular  audiences. 


viii  THE  RUSSIAN  PROBLEM 

The  letter  to  the  Times  on  the  psychology  of 
a  nation  has  also  been  well  received  on  its 
appearance,  and,  as  the  theme  is  closely 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  lecture,  I 
have  taken  leave  to  reproduce  its  text. 


CONTENTS 


PAOE 

INTRODUCTORY  NOTE v 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 


RUSSIA.     The  Psychology  of  a  Nation      .         .         .         .29 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

The  war,  with  all  its  calamities  and  bereave- 
ments, has  certain  redeeming  features  :  it  forces 
us  to  look  beyond  the  surface,  to  verify  esti- 
mates and  to  brush  away  prejudices,  to  seek 
for  adequate  explanations  of  striking  events. 
It  is  from  this  educational  point  of  view  that 
I  should  like  to  approach  my  subject.  I  am 
not  going  to  trespass  on  the  domain  of  strate- 
gists and  military  historians.  I  do  not  intend 
to  deal  with  the  causes  of  the  war,  the  justifi- 
cation of  Russian  efforts,  the  curious  history 
of  diplomatic  moves  which  led  up  to  the  colli- 
sion. All  these  things  have  been  brilliantly 
discussed  by  competent  authorities.  I  wish  to 
consider  the  aims  and  methods  of  Russia. 
The  subject  is  a  momentous  problem  for  the 
nations  of  Europe,  and  much  will  depend  on 
its  right  solution.  But  the  problem  is  even 
more  pressing  and  momentous  for  the  Russians 
themselves. 

A  great  help  in  such  an  inquiry  is  afforded 


2  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

by   a   review   of  the   historical   surroundings. 
History  is  not  a  science  enabling  us  to  predict 
coming  events  with  exactness,  but  it  does  make 
a  signal  difference  whether  we  consider  facts  of 
social  life  as  detached  experiences  or  as  links  in 
a  chain  of  development.    In  the  first  instance  we 
shall  hardly  have  anything  to  guide  us  but  the 
impressions  and  appetites  of  the  moment.     In 
the  second,  we  are  able  to  obtain  a  wide  per- 
spective and  a  basis  for  rational  plans.     Turn- 
ing to  the  case  in  point,  it  is  one  thing  to  state 
observations  as  to  the  politics  and  culture  of 
present-day  Russia,   and  another  to  judge  of 
Russian  political  and  cultural  evolution  in  the 
light  of  the  history  of  Europe,  and  especially 
of  Eastern  Europe.     When  we  look  at  abso- 
lutism, bureaucracy,  or  the  domineering  habits 
of  military   aristocracy    in   Russia   from   this 
second  point  of  view,  we  perceive  at  once  that 
what  we  have  to  deal  with  is  not  the  peculiar 
product  of  Byzantine  servilism  or  Muscovite 
brutality,  but  one  of  the  features  of  Eastern 
European  development,  the  expression  of  forces 
which  have  been  at  work  and  are  still  at  work 
in  Prussia  and  Austria  as  well. 

If  historical  laws  are  to  be  formulated  at  all, 
one  of  the  most  certain  and  conspicuous  among 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  3 

them  may  be  summed  up  in  the  observation 
that  social  progress  starts  from  countries  with 
a  well-differentiated  sea-board,  and  gradually 
spreads  to  the  more  massive  continental  blocks. 
Eventually  these  blocks  of  hinterland  may  prove 
more  fertile  and  rich  in  culture  than  the  tracts 
which  have  assumed  the  initiative  ;  but  it  is 
in  river  deltas,  in  peninsulas,  and  in  islands 
that  the  movement  of  civilisation  originates. 
Greece  and  Italy,  France  and  England,  were 
leaders  in  Europe  when  the  banks  of  the  Elbe, 
of  the  Danube,  of  the  Vistula,  and  of  the  Volga 
were  wildernesses.  Even  in  modern  times  the 
French  borrowed  largely  from  the  Italians,  the 
English  from  the  French,  the  Germans  both 
from  English  and  French,  and  the  Russians 
from  the  Germans.  No  wonder  Peter  the 
Great  named  his  new  capital  Petersburg — as 
Frederick  the  Great,  while  defeating  the  French 
in  the  field,  acknowledged  their  supremacy  in 
literature  and  science,  and  wrote  French  with 
greater  ease  than  German.  The  two  most 
famous  pronouncements  of  Prussian  state- 
craft in  the  eighteenth  century  are  tinged  by 
French  thought.  Monarchy  was  to  be  the 
rocher  de  bronze  —  the  bronze  rock  of  the 
Prussian    system.      Every   one    was    to    seek 


4  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

salvation  *  nach  seiner  faqon ' — in  his  own 
fashion.  In  the  same  way,  Russia  has  been 
taking  lessons  from  German  administrators 
and  thinkers. 

Faced  with  problems  of  colonisation  and 
self-defence,  unprotected  by  the  silver  streak 
of  the  sea,  unwilling  to  subordinate  considera- 
tions of  safety  to  the  claims  of  individual 
liberty,  the  three  eastern  states  have  sacrificed 
many  elements  of  prosperity  and  progress  to 
discipline  and  efficiency  in  war.  Even  now 
the  Austrian  Emperor  may  assume  dictatorial 
power  on  the  strength  of  the  fourteenth  clause 
of  a  constitutional  law.  His  personal  authority 
remains  the  chief  link  of  union  in  his  hetero- 
geneous empire,  and  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
has  repeatedly  exerted  his  supreme  power  for 
adjusting  difficulties.  Quite  recently  repre- 
sentative government  has  been  suspended  by 
4  Acts  of  State  '  in  Bohemia  and  Croatia.  As 
for  Germany,  the  franchise  in  Prussia  is  per- 
verted by  a  narrow  property  classification, 
while  Mecklenburg  enjoys  the  unenviable  dis- 
tinction of  being  the  only  country  in  Europe 
which  still  clings  to  a  system  of  estates.  Even 
the  stunted  constitutionalism  of  modern 
Prussia  and  modern  Austria  is  of  quite  recent 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  5 

growth.  The  principle  that  the  '  scanty  intel- 
ligence of  subjects  '  should  not  be  allowed  to 
meddle  with  statecraft  is  of  German  origin. 
It  gave  way  in  Prussia  during  the  Revolution 
of  1848,  but  was  triumphantly  reasserted  in 
the  reaction  of  the  'fifties  and  in  the  conflict 
between  the  Prussian  government  and  national 
representation  in  the  'sixties.  Germany  is  in- 
debted for  its  constitutional  regeneration  to 
the  victorious  struggle  of  1870.  In  Austria, 
liberal  institutions  have  sprung  from  defeats  : 
the  humiliation  of  military  absolutism  in  1859 
gave  the  first  blow  to  political  absolutism,  and 
the  collapse  in  1866  resulted  in  the  setting  up 
of  the  present  Dual  Monarchy  in  its  constitu- 
tional shape. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  perceive  the  analogy 
between  these  retreats  of  absolutism  in  Prussia 
and  in  Austria  and  the  evolution  of  Russia. 
The  protector  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  Emperor 
Nicholas  i.,  seemed  to  embody  the  conception 
of  Hobbes's  Leviathan,  and  he  experienced  in 
his  fate  the  hollowness  of  a  political  dream 
requiring  that  every  live  man  in  the  country 
should  be  paralysed  in  order  that  Leviathan 
should  think  and  act  like  one  man.  The 
Crimean   War   showed   what   a    poor  thing   a 


6  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

machine  State  is  even  when  composed  of  per- 
sonally brave  men.  The  object-lesson  went 
home  in  the  case  of  the  government  as  well  as 
in  that  of  the  people,  and  the  forces  of  political 
insight,  patriotic  devotion,  intellectual  con- 
centration, which  had  been  stealthily  but 
steadily  gathering  beneath  the  iron  frame  of 
the  Nicholas  regime,  asserted  themselves  in  an 
unexpected  manner  ;  the  glorious  generation 
of  the  'sixties  achieved  work  unsurpassed  in 
any  land  for  breadth  of  view  and  far-reaching 
results  :  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs,  the 
creation  of  local  self-government,  the  regenera- 
tion of  the  courts,  the  beginnings  of  an  inde- 
pendent press,  the  national  reform  of  military 
service,  the  reconstitution  of  the  universities 
as  self-governing  bodies — all  these  and  many 
minor  reforms  were  carried  out  at  that  time. 

Unfortunately,  changes  of  that  magnitude 
resemble  natural  processes  in  which  the  ulti- 
mate settlement  is  preceded  by  conflicts  between 
elemental  forces.  It  is  sufficiently  known  how 
the  reform  movement  was  arrested  by  the 
fatal  split  between  the  progressive  parties 
which  strove  for  parliamentary  government, 
and  the  Conservatives  who  rallied  around  the 
principle  of  autocracy.     Terroristic   attempts, 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  7 

culminating  in  the  murder  of  Alexander  the 
Second,  brought  about  the  long  reaction  under 
Alexander  the  Third,  and  the  policy  of  con- 
tradictions after  his  death.  The  country  had, 
as  it  were,  to  pass  another  examination  in  the 
Japanese  War,  and  the  defects  of  the  auto- 
cratic system  were  again  revealed  in  a  con- 
spicuous manner  by  the  inefficiency  of  the 
army  and  the  lack  of  public  spirit  in  the 
people.  Then  came  a  time  resembling  the 
Revolution  of  1848  in  Central  Europe.  Im- 
portant positions  were  permanently  gained  : 
the  beginnings  of  national  representation,  the 
declaration  of  civic  rights,  an  increased  freedom 
of  the  press.  But  on  the  exuberance  of 
idealism  followed  a  bitter  awakening  to  the 
significance  of  very  real  obstacles  :  the  indif- 
ference of  the  great  mass  of  the  people,  the 
danger  to  social  order  from  lawless  outcasts, 
the  inexperience  and  doctrinaire  delusions  of 
popular  leaders.  The  analogy  between  Russia 
in  1906  and  Germany  in  1848  is  striking  even 
as  regards  details  :  when  one  reads  the  speeches 
in  the  first  Duma,  one  cannot  help  recalling 
to  mind  the  debates  of  the  Frankfort  parlia- 
ment. 

And  now,  after  some  eight  years  of  gloomy 


8  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

reaction,  we  stand  again  at  the  parting  of  the 
ways.     The    war    of    the    nations,    in    which 
thousands  of  the  best  men  of  Russia  are  being 
sacrificed,  has  united  all  in  the  fundamental 
duty  of  self-defence;   but,  more  than  this,  it 
drives  people  not  only  to  postpone  their  strife, 
but  to  reconsider  their  positions,  to  reflect  on 
the  problem  of  reconstruction  which  looms  in 
the  background  and  will  have  to  be  tackled 
in    earnest   when   the    days   of    marches   and 
battles  have  passed.     Great  words  have  been 
pronounced  from  the  height  of  the  throne  in 
an  appeal  to  united  Russia,  and  this  appeal 
has  been  responded  to  fully  and  warmly  by  all 
parties  and  nationalities.     It  is  a  united  and 
not  a  divided  Russia  that  ought  to  solve  the 
problem  of  reconstruction.     An  effort  must  be 
made  to  approach  it  in  the  light  of  past  experi- 
ence as  well  as  of  future  aims,  without  doctrin- 
airism    and  without  selfishness,    in   the  same 
noble  spirit  of  patriotic  duty  which  has  given 
such  wonderful  strength  to  the  Russian  armies 
in   the    field.      What   we    want    in   Russia   is 
not  gambling  in  revolution  with  its  fantastic 
prospects    and    terrible    realities.      We    want 
thorough  organic  reforms,  something  like  the 
movement  of  the   'sixties   on  a  larger  scale. 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  9 

The  situation  would  be  a  providential  one  for 
a  statesman  of  the  calibre  of  Bismarck.  The 
great  German  Chancellor,  though  a  Prussian 
junker  by  birth,  and  a  Conservative  by  allegi- 
ance, had  the  strength  of  mind  to  frame  the 
democratic  constitution  of  the  German  Empire. 
The  imperial  government  in  Russia  should  be 
able  to  perceive  that  the  uncontested  leader- 
ship of  the  nation  through  this  war  imposes 
the  moral  obligation  of  generous  and  far- 
sighted  political  action.  The  popularity  ac- 
quired by  victories  should  not  be  squandered 
in  petty  gains  or  in  the  lethargy  of  fatigue. 
Opportunities  like  the  present  do  not  recur 
twice.  It  would  be  too  awful  to  think  that  this 
one  should  be  lost,  and  that  the  dark  waves  of 
discontent  and  despair  should  again  resume 
their  ceaseless,  battering  onslaught  against  the 
foundations  of  Russian  historical  institutions. 

In  any  case,  the  course  of  Russian  political 
evolution  follows  on  parallel  lines  with  that  of 
Russia's  western  neighbours  :  from  personal 
rule  towards  constitutionalism.  The  attempt 
to  trace  a  contrast  between  Russia  and  the 
two  neighbouring  states  is  altogether  mis- 
leading. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of  the 


10  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

assets  on  which  a  reforming  statesmanship 
can  reckon  :  indirectly  such  an  examination 
will  suggest  some  of  the  aims  of  progressive 
evolution. 

The  first  and  greatest  asset  of  Russia  is  its 
peasant  democracy.  The  population  of  the 
empire  amounts  at  present  to  some  170,000,000, 
and  of  these  some  80  per  cent.,  that  is  about 
140,000,000,  are  peasants,  small  cultivating 
landowners,  in  parts  rising  to  the  status 
of  what  used  to  be  called  in  old  England, 
yeomanry.  This  is  the  condition  of  the 
Cossacks,  for  example.  These  figures  are 
worth  careful  consideration.  In  one  of  his 
vivid  letters  to  the  Times,  Stephen  Graham 
speaks  of  the  endless  flow  of  Russian  troops 
through  Moscow  in  the  period  of  mobilisation 
— c  a  magnificent  peasantry  '  he  calls  them  ; 
and  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  when  writing  from  the 
Japanese  headquarters  in  the  war  of  1904, 
could  not  help  being  struck,  even  in  that  un- 
fortunate campaign,  by  the  qualities  of  the 
Russian  private  soldier,  which  he  rightly 
ascribed  to  peasant  origin  and  bringing  up. 
Now  the  '  magnificent  peasantry  '  is  a  force 
not  only  in  the  military  sense.  Efforts  are 
being  made  by  all  political  parties  in  England 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  11 

to  revive  small  land  holdings  which  have  been 
swept  away  by  the  course  of  economic  evolu- 
tion. It  is  a  great  question  whether  this  can 
be  done  nowadays,  but  we  all  feel  that  in- 
dustrial development,  however  fruitful  in  some 
respects,  however  necessary  from  an  economic 
point  of  view,  is  fraught  with  danger  from  the 
social  point  of  view :  it  severs  the  living  con- 
nection of  the  people  with  the  soil,  and  subjects 
man  too  much  to  the  garish  trend  of  town  life. 

Russia  is  fortunate  enough  to  possess 
140,000,000  of  frugal,  hard-working  tillers  of 
the  soil.  Even  in  the  hard  age  of  serfdom  the 
peasantry  succeeded  in  preserving  personal 
dignity  and  an  unwavering  allegiance  to  its 
religious  and  political  creeds.  The  village 
community  was  a  strong  shield  in  those  days  : 
in  spite  of  numberless  acts  of  cruelty  and 
arbitrary  extortion  on  the  part  of  the  lords, 
it  helped  to  keep  up  cohesion  between  the 
members  of  the  peasant  class  and  a  standard 
of  rural  custom.  The  village,  the  mir,  could  be 
described  as  the  necessary  defensive  organisa- 
tion of  the  people. 

But  it  proved  to  be  a  fetter  for  offensive 
purposes,  that  is,  for  enterprise  and  progress, 
and  it  is  slowly  giving  way  before  an  individual- 


12  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

istic  movement  starting  from  the  emancipa- 
tion of  1861,  and  fostered  by  recent  statutory- 
measures.     In  spite  of  many  shortcomings  of 
legislation  and  policy  in  this  respect,  one  thing 
seems  clear  :   this  growth  of  private  ownership 
has  given  an  immense  impetus  to  energy  and 
thrift.     And  what  is  still  more  remarkable,  the 
habit  of  acting  together,  of  making  compro- 
mises and  arranging  for  joint  effort,  a  habit 
acquired  in  connection  with  mir  management, 
has  not  disappeared  now  that  the  village  com- 
munity is  making  way  for  contractual  relations. 
Co-operative   associations  arise  everywhere   in 
instinctive  and  exuberant  growth.     Recently 
British    estates    and    agricultural    exhibitions 
were  visited  by  unexpected  guests — by  farmers 
from   Siberia — members   of  a  widespread  and 
powerful  co-operative  union.     The  same  may 
be  said  of  workmen  and  agricultural  labourers 
— they  naturally  form  closely  fitted  co-operative 
groups— the    so-called    artels.     This    enormous 
peasant  mass  is  well  able  to  take  care  of  itself, 
and    the    object    of    reforming    legislation    in 
regard  to  it  should  be  to  remove  police  inter- 
ference and  to  give  free  play  to  its  life.     One 
institution,  born  of  the  aristocratic  reaction  of 
Alexander  the   Third's  time — the  tutelage   of 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  13 

the  land-captains — the  squires  wielding  police 
power  and  administering  justice,  ought  to 
disappear  as  soon  as  possible,  and  a  beginning 
has  been  made  in  this  direction  by  the  third 
Duma. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  lamentable  gap 
to  be  filled  up  as  regards  provision  for  the  poor. 
The  mobilisation  of  landed  property  is  bound 
to  occasion  an  immense  amount  of  distress  in 
spite  of  certain  beneficial  effects.  Weak  and 
improvident  members  of  the  villages  are  losing 
the  support  of  communal  organisations,  and 
their  hold  on  the  land  ;  the  rural  proletariat 
is  increasing  fast,  and  yet  the  problem  of  public 
assistance  has  not  been  properly  tackled. 
Russian  legislators  should  take  to  heart  the 
example  of  England,  where  the  initial  move 
in  the  historv  of  the  Poor  Laws,  the  Statute  of 
1603,  followed  closely  on  the  disintegration  of 
the  ancient  customary  community  of  copy- 
holders. The  old  system  of  throwing  the  care 
of  the  destitute  mainly  on  the  villages  was  not 
a  success,  even  in  former  days.  Mendicancy 
was  always  one  of  the  open  sores  of  Russia, 
partly,  no  doubt,  on  account  of  the  national 
leaning  towards  personal  charity,  fostered  by 
religious   impulses.     These   economically   mis- 


14  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

directed  efforts  are  altogether  insufficient  to 
cope  with  the  evil  now,  and  a  comprehensive 
poor  law  is  certainly  one  of  the  needs  of  the 
situation.  The  development  of  credit  to  help 
agriculture  and  industry,  as  well  as  systematic 
measures  in  aid  of  emigration,  are,  of  course, 
also  indicated,  and  important  beginnings  have 
already  been  made  in  these  directions. 

Besides  all  these  economical  and  technical 
improvements,  there  is  one  requirement  which 
towers  above  all  the  rest — the  requirement  of 
popular  education.  If  the  Russian  peasants 
were  to  remain  illiterate  thev  might  not  count 
for  more  in  the  balance  of  cultural  power  than 
the  ryots  of  the  Dekkan  or  the  fellahin  of 
Egypt.  The  truth  of  this  is  now  fully  recog- 
nised in  Russia,  and  constant  and  rapid  progress 
may  be  registered  in  this  respect.  The  pro- 
vision of  elementary  schools  has  become,  since 
the  'sixties,  the  principal  plank  in  the  admini- 
strative programme  of  local  self-governing 
bodies,  of  municipalities  and  county  councils. 

Incitements  in  this  direction  have  been  pro- 
vided by  every  period  of  trial  and  distress. 
The  famine  and  cholera  years  1891-1893,  for 
example,  gave  a  strong  impulse  towards  ener- 
getic action,  because  it  was  recognised  on  all 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  15 

hands  that  the  best  means  of  guarding  against 
disease  and  counteracting  bad  seasons  lay  in 
provident  husbandry  and  a  certain  standard 
of  instruction.  Even  the  reaction  after  the 
revolutionarv  outbreak  of  1905  and  1906  did 
not  contest  this  point,  and  the  bureaucratic 
ministries  of  Stolypin,  Kokovtzoff ,  and  Gorcmy- 
kin  have  had  to  come  into  line  with  public 
feeling  on  the  subject.  The  honour  of  driving 
back  the  flood  of  illiteracy  belongs,  however, 
primarily  to  the  self-governing  institutions  of 
the  provinces  and  towns.  In  order  to  give 
an  idea  of  the  material  efforts  connected  with 
the  movement,  let  me  state  that  in  1ST?  there 
were  about  10.000  provincial  schools,  and  in 
1911,  28,000;  and  that  the  zemst'cos  (provincial 
councils)  spent  9,000,000  roubles  (somewhat  less 
than  £1,000,000)  on  their  schools  in  1895,  and 
73,000,000  (more  than  £7,000,000)  in  1912,  the 
latter  sum  corresponding  to  nearly  30  per 
cent,  of  their  entire  budget.  The  time  is 
approaching  when  all  the  children  in  Russia 
will  receive  at  least  three  years'  elementary 
schooling. 

In  more  progressive  centres,  like  the  capitals, 
universal  education  has  already  been  reached. 
I  may  instance,  briefly,  the  way  in  winch  we 


16  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

carried  out  the  task  in  Moscow  fourteen  years 
ago,  when  I  was  myself  engaged  on  the  work 
of  the  educational  committee  of  that  city. 
We  worked  out  an  expanding  scheme  for  the 
provision  of  classes  to  meet  the  requirements 
of  all  children  reaching  the  school  age,  whom 
their  parents  would  care  to  send  to  the  schools. 
We  could  not  make  attendance  compulsory  by 
law,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  all  the  families 
of  the  city,  the  population  of  which  at  that 
time  numbered  about  1,000,000,  with  a  negli- 
gible number  of  exceptions,  did  send  their  boys 
and  girls  to  the  town  schools.  Thus  schooling 
was  universal  without  being  compulsory.  The 
course  embraced  three  years,  but  it  is  being 
gradually  extended  to  four ;  and  secondary 
schools  of  all  kinds  are  growing  fast. 

For  the  nation  as  a  whole,  a  definite  scheme 
has  been  worked  out  and  has  obtained  the 
support  of  the  Duma,  by  which  a  network  of 
schools  sufficient  to  compass  the  entire  popu- 
lation of  school  age  of  the  agricultural  pro- 
vinces of  the  Empire,  will  be  organised  and 
started  in  the  course  of  some  eight  to  ten  years. 
This  will  be  done,  of  course,  with  the  help  of 
liberal  appropriations  from  the  treasury,  but 
it  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  the  pioneers 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  17 

of  elementary  education  in  Russia  have  been 
the  local  self-governing  bodies. 

The  second  general  inference  from  our  survey 
should  be  that  the  future  of  Russia  depends  on 
the  essentially  peaceful  process  of  democratic 
enlightenment  and  economic  improvement. 
There  is  yet  another  fundamental  asset  in  the 
life  of  modern  Russia.  In  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
political  strife,  people  are  sometimes  apt  to 
overlook  the  great  continuous  lines  which  mark 
the  trend  of  development  and  ensure  progress. 
We  have  seen  what  a  broad  democratic  basis  is 
provided  by  the  peasant  population  of  the  Em- 
pire and  how  all  branches  of  activity  have  to  be 
connected  in  one  way  or  another  with  the  mighty 
trunk  of  the  country — the  Russian  peasantry. 
The  middle  classes  have  also  something  to  show 
in  their  history  which  is  very  different  from  the 
supposed  servility  of  Russian  political  customs. 

In  1864  the  state  was  obliged  to  recognise 
that  the  affairs  of  the  nation  could  not  be 
directed  satisfactorily  by  orders  from  the 
centre,  that  something  more  was  needed  than 
busy  chancelleries  and  provincial  governors  with 
discretionary  powers.  The  zemstvos — county 
and  district  councils — were  created  by  law  to 
take  care  of  local  affairs— of  roads,  of  sanitary 


18  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

work,  of  schools,  of  hospitals  and  almshouses, 
of  veterinary  inspection,  of  rural  credit  and 
agronomic  improvements.  This  vast  domain 
was  not  surrendered  without  misgivings  and 
restrictions— a  jealous  supervision  by  police 
officials,  governors,  and  the  home  ministry  was 
extended  over  the  whole  area  of  the  self- 
governing  zemstvos  and  towns. 

Another  antidote  against  too  liberal  a  policy 
of  the  newly  created  bodies  was  provided  by 
their  composition.  The  Statute  of  1864,  and 
even  more  that  of  1890,  passed  under  the 
reactionary  influences  of  Alexander  the  Third's 
reign,  gave  a  privileged  position  in  the  zemstvos 
to  the  landed  gentry  or  noblesse.  This  was 
achieved  by  a  complicated  system  of  electoral 
colleges  and  a  restricted  franchise.  It  would 
be  impossible  to  examine  these  measures  in 
detail.  They  found  their  historical  explana- 
tion in  the  fact  that  the  gentry  had  for  cen- 
turies supplied  the  official  and  military  class 
which  helped  to  organise  and  to  rule  the  vast 
empire.  At  this  stage,  however,  class  legisla- 
tion of  this  kind  proved  to  be  mischievous  and 
was  doomed  to  failure ;  the  gentry  is  fast 
losing  ground  in  consequence  of  the  emancipa- 
tion of  the  rural  serfs  ;    estate  after  estate  is 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  19 

passing  into  the  hands  of  business  men  and  of 
the  rising  peasantry. 

The  privileged  position  in  zemstvo  self- 
government  naturally  led  to  abuses  of  influ- 
ence and  to  corruption,  but  in  spite  of  all  such 
checks,  the  institution  struck  firm  roots  and 
prospered.  The  history  of  the  advance  towards 
better  sanitation,  more  numerous  and  better 
schools,  technical  improvements  of  all  kinds, 
is  the  history  of  one  wearisome  and  protracted 
struggle  between  the  growing  forces  of  public 
opinion  and  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  old 
regime.  The  rearguard  fights  of  the  latter 
often  assumed  the  character  of  desperate 
counter-attacks,  but  the  flow  of  self-govern- 
ment continued  to  press  on  with  elemental 
force.  With  all  its  drawbacks  and  imperfec- 
tions the  zemstvo  movement  has  been  one  of 
the  most  astonishing  illustrations  of  the  action 
of  leading  ideas  on  masses— and  also  of  the 
aptitude  of  the  Russians  for  social  work. 
Sometimes,  in  the  days  of  great  national 
calamities,  during  years  of  famine  or  of 
epidemics,  in  the  course  of  a  great  war,  with 
its  immense  numbers  of  wounded  and  sick  to 
be  tended,  the  stream  overflowed  its  banks,  as 
it  were,  and  emergency  organisations  enlisted 


20  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

the  services  of  countless  untiring  and  fearless 
workers  from  all  classes  of  society. 

Such  movements  are  disliked  by  hierarchical 
bureaucracy,  but  they  cannot  be  prevented  or 
ignored,  and  the  future  lies  in  the  recognition  of 
a  constant  participation  of  the  people  at  large, 
in  all  its  classes,  in  public  work.  One  of  the 
first  measures  necessary  in  that  direction  is  the 
creation  of  what  is  called  in  Russia  the  small 
zemstvo  unit,  of  a  civil  parish  uniting  members 
of  all  classes  in  the  self-governing  locality. 
Under  the  present  system  the  peasants,  though 
emancipated,  form  rural  units  of  their  own, 
while  all  other  inhabitants— small  landowners, 
merchants,  artisans,  clerks,  members  of  the 
liberal  professions— are  only  organised  in  the 
province  and  district  or  not  organised  at  all 
for  self-government.  When  this  anomaly  is 
remedied,  a  firm  basis  will  be  gained  for 
widening  the  zemstvo  franchise  with  its 
attendant  responsibilities  and  rights.  In  the 
towns  the  defects  of  class  privilege  are  less 
felt,  but  an  extension  of  the  franchise  is  also 
urgently  needed. 

One  of  the  effects  of  such  an  extension  may 
prove  to  be  unexpected  :  I  think  it  will 
strengthen    rational    conservatism.     The    un- 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  21 

■ 

organised  third  estate  of  Russia,  the  vague 
class  called  the  4  intelligents,'  and  led  by  the 
liberal  professions — lawyers,  doctors,  statis- 
ticians, engineers,  and  teachers — is  at  present 
often  revolutionary  and  apt  to  indulge  in  un- 
practical speculations,  because  it  has  no  stake 
in  the  everyday  management  of  public  affairs. 
Its  members  have  often  a  thorough  experience 
in  certain  branches  of  public  work,  for  example, 
in  medical  attendance  on  the  poor ;  but  they 
are  made  to  act  as  subordinate  officials  under 
orders  from  the  squires  and  rich  traders  who 
control  the  counties  and  the  municipalities. 
Such  a  position  naturally  produces  bitterness 
and  sweeping  criticism.  The  greater  the  stake  tj 
of  every  citizen  in  public  affairs,  the  more 
readily  he  will  recognise  limitations  and  cope 
with  difficulties  in  a  practical  manner.  One  t 
thing  is  certain,  the  channels  for  sound  self- 
government  exist  in  Russia,  and  it  is  only 
necessary  to  widen  them  and  to  build  out  their 
network. 

What  is  to  be  said  about  the  central  govern- 
ment itself  ?  This  is  the  part  of  the  edifice 
which  is  most  noticeable  to  the  view  of 
foreigners  and  which  has  certainly  an  immense 
importance  in  shaping  the  general  course  of 


22  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

political  life.  In  this  matter,  more  than  in 
anything  else,  it  is  impossible  to  express  more 
than  a  personal  opinion,  conditioned  by  a 
party  point  of  view,  but  even  such  personal 
opinions  may  be  worth  consideration.  It  seems 
clear,  to  begin  with,  that  it  would  be  a  fatal 
mistake  to  indulge  in  anti-monarchical,  anti- 
dynastic  agitation.  Men  from  the  extreme  left 
may  be  to  some  extent  bound  by  revolutionary 
antecedents,  the  majority  even  on  the  radical 
side  will,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  perceive  that,  after 
a  glorious  war  in  which  the  nation  has  rallied 
with  the  sure  instinct  of  self-preservation 
round  its  historical  leader,  it  would  not  be 
proper  to  challenge  the  authority  of  this 
leader.  Even  apart  from  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  the  moment,  Russia  needs  a  strong 
central  power,  endowed  with  uncontested 
sovereignty,  armed  with  the  full  force  of 
popular  delegation.  But  just  because  the 
Tsar  undoubtedly  wields  such  a  power,  its 
holder  need  not  resort  to  any  petty  expedients, 
or  indulge  in  party  strife,  or  aspire  to  meddle 
in  all  the  details  of  legislation  and  adminis- 
tration. The  competence  of  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  cannot  be  circumscribed  by  the  limita- 
tions  of  classical   parliamentary  government. 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  23 

The  maxim  '  le  roi  regne,  mais  ne  gouverne  pas  '    / 
could  not  be  applied  to  him  in  common  sense. 
But  no  more  would  the  maxim  '  l'Etat  c'est 
moi '  be  applicable  in  this  case. 

A  sovereign  exercising  the  supreme  regulating 
power  in  the  Empire  can  well  afford  to  take  care 
that  popular  representation  in  his  State  should 
not  be  a  farce  and  that  his  ministers  should 
not  act  as  the  viziers  of  an  Oriental  despot. 
Cabinet  government  and  the  rule  of  parlia- 
mentary majorities  may  still  be  far  ahead  in 
Russian  political  evolution,  but  a  reform  of 
the  Duma,  which  would  do  away  with  the 
Austrian-born  jugglery  of  electoral  colleges 
and  a  prohibitive  franchise,  is  a  first  step  which 
ought  not  to  be  delayed  much  longer.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  introduce  universal  suffrage 
according  to  the  famous  four-tailed  formula — 
universal,  equal,  secret,  and  direct.  Let  there 
by  all  means  be  a  householder's  franchise  or 
election  in  two  stages,  but  the  electoral  system 
ought  to  be  simple  and  conduce  to  a  manifesta- 
tion of  genuine  public  opinion. 

A  necessary  complement  to  the  reform  of 
the  Duma  must  be  that  of  the  Russian  House 
of  Lords — the  Council  of  the  Empire.  In  its 
present  condition  it  is  a  clog  on  all  progressive 


24  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

legislation.  Even  bills  passed  by  the  arti- 
ficially manipulated  Duma  of  our  days  have 
stuck  in  the  Council  of  the  Empire.  A  notable 
example  was  the  measure  granting  self- 
government  to  the  Polish  provinces.  It  was 
surrounded  in  the  Duma  with  all  sorts  of 
guarantees  against  possible  misuse  by  the 
Poles,  but  it  contained  one  important  and  vital 
concession — it  allowed  the  Poles  to  use  their 
own  language  in  the  debates  of  county  and 
town  councils.  The  Council  of  the  Empire 
struck  out  this  clause.  Characteristically 
enough  the  bill  was  re-introduced  by  the 
government  with  the  objectionable  clause — 
by  express  command  of  the  Emperor.  If  a 
Second  Chamber  is  to  exist  and  to  play  a  useful 
part  in  Russian  political  life,  it  must  be  entirely 
reconstructed.  Instead  of  a  majority  com- 
posed of  superannuated  bureaucrats,  with  a 
sprinkling  of  elective  elements,  it  ought  to  be 
based  on  the  representation  of  public  bodies 
and  interests — the  county  councils,  the  leading 
professional  and  economic  organisations. 

Again,  even  if  it  should  be  out  of  the  question 
to  speak  of  ministries  formed  from  the  leading 
political  parties,  if  the  ministers  remain  officials 
selected  and  directed  by  the  Tsar,  they  should 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  25 

be  chosen  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  defy  clearly 
expressed  public  opinion.  Surely  it  is  not 
wise  to  place  and  keep  in  office  men  who  have 
been  repeatedly  denounced  by  assemblies  con- 
stituted to  please  the  government.  The  baneful 
discord  of  views  and  policy  which  nowadays  is 
almost  a  standing  feature  of  Russian  politics 
ought  to  cease  :  it  is  not  a  symptom  of  health. 
A  more  difficult  problem  arises  in  regard  to 
the  large  bureaucratic  establishments  of  the 
civil  service.  The  traditions  of  bureaucracy  are 
certainly  not  promising,  and  yet  one  can  neither 
get  rid  of  the  complex  mechanism  of  central 
control  nor  alter  its  spirit  and  habits  at  one 
stroke.  The  problem  of  gradual  sanitation  is 
not  insoluble,  however,  if  the  new  watchwords 
of  legality  and  respect  for  individual  freedom 
be  firmly  given  out  and  enforced.  There  is  in 
the  modern  history  of  Russia  a  remarkable 
instance  of  a  very  rapid  improvement  in  a 
kindred  domain,  namely,  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice.  The  courts  were  notoriously 
corrupt  and  pettifogging  in  the  old  days,  and 
yet  the  great  statutes  of  1864  were  wonder- 
fully efficient  in  introducing  new  principles 
and  new  methods.  A  similar  new  orientation 
must  be  effected  as  regards  the  civil  services  ; 


26  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  universities  will 
not  fail  in  infusing  new  blood  into  the  adminis- 
trative personnel,  as  they  have  done  in  the 
case  of  the  judicature. 

One  idea  has  to  be  kept  well  in  view  all  the 
time.  It  is  not  so  much  technical  changes  that 
are  important,  although  these  will  have  to  be 
taken  in  hand  ;  the  most  important  point  is 
the  substitution  of  the  rule  of  law  and  freedom 
for  the  reign  of  arbitrary  discretion.  A  firm 
Habeas  Corpus  Act,  a  real  application  of  the 
various  liberties,  which  for  Europeans  are  as 
necessary  as  breathing  air,— freedom  of  con- 
science, freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  associa- 
tion, freedom  of  meetings,  equality  before  the 
law— these  are  the  things  needed  above  all  in 
Russia.  These  liberties  are  recognised  in  prin- 
ciple and  stunted  in  application.  On  the 
17th  of  October  1914  a  solemn  pledge  was 
taken  to  give  these  principles  full  play  and 
adequate  guarantees,  but  the  country  is  still 
waiting  for  the  fulfilment  of  this  pledge.  That 
is  where  the  Jewish  question  comes  in,  of 
course.  Racial  antipathy  and  the  fact  that 
the  Jewish  character  has  specific  defects  as  well 
as  specific  qualities  do  not  warrant  a  treat- 
ment of  our  Jewish  countrymen  as  equals  in 


RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR  27 

burdens  and  as  outcasts  in  rights.  This 
anomaly  has  existed  more  or  less  everywhere 
in  Europe,  and  everywhere  it  has  given  way — 
so  it  will  be  in  Russia,  and  the  longer  the  day 
of  emancipation  is  delayed,  the  more  difficult 
it  will  be  to  effect  the  ultimate  settlement. 

I  do  not  want,  however,  to  discuss  problems 
of  detail  at  any  length  :  my  object  was  to  set 
forth  what  appear  to  me  to  be  the  conditions 
of  the  one  and  main  problem — the  conditions 
of  Russia's  coming  of  age  in  public  life.  Nor 
do  I  want  to  prophesy  in  regard  to  the  steps 
and  circumstances  by  which  the  transforma- 
tion will  be  effected  :  details  will  depend  on 
many  accidents  which  no  one  can  foresee ; 
nor  is  it  likely  that  the  walls  of  Jericho  will 
fall  at  one  blast  of  the  trumpets.  But  apart 
from  details,  I  firmly  believe  that  the  trans- 
formation is  approaching,  and  I  hope  it  may 
be  effected  somewhat  on  the  lines  I  have 
sketched.  I  am  sure  of  one  thing — the  people 
of  Russia,  and  more  especially  the  educated 
class,  the  '  intelligents,'  will  revive  in  the 
atmosphere  of  the  great  reform  movement  and 
may  yet  astonish  the  world  in  peace  as  in  war. 
The  educated  Russian,  of  whom  I  can  speak 
with  some  knowledge,  may  have  many  faults — 


28  RUSSIA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

he  may  be  too  impulsive,  lacking  in  discipline, 
inexperienced  in  politics ;  but  he  has  one 
quality  which  will  save  him  and  will  save  his 
country.  He  is  longing  to  serve  a  great  idea 
and  to  merge  his  insignificant  self  in  a  common 
cause.  He  is  by  nature  a  crusader.  Let  us 
wish  success  to  his  crusade. 


RUSSIA1 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION 

In  this  time  of  crisis,  when  the  clash  of  ideas 
seems  as  fierce  as  the  struggle  of  the  hosts,  it  is 
the  duty  of  those  who  possess  authentic  infor- 
mation on  one  or  the  other  point  in  dispute  to 
speak  out  firmly  and  clearly.  I  should  like 
to  contribute  some  observations  on  German 
and  Russian  conceptions  in  matters  of  culture. 
I  base  my  claim  to  be  heard  on  the  fact  that  I 
have  had  the  privilege  of  being  closely  con- 
nected with  Russian,  German,  and  English 
life.  As  a  Russian  Liberal,  who  had  to  give 
up  an  honourable  position  at  home  for  the 
sake  of  his  opinions,  I  can  hardly  be  suspected 
of  subserviency  to  the  Russian  bureaucracy. 

I  am  struck  by  the  insistence  with  which 
the  Germans  represent  their  cause  in  this 
world-wide  struggle  as  the  cause  of  civilisation 
as  opposed  to  Muscovite  barbarism  ;   and  I  am 

1  Reprinted,  by  permission,  from  the  Times  of  September  14, 
1914. 

29 


30  RUSSIA 

not  sure  that  some  of  my  English  friends  do 
not  feel  reluctant  to  side  with  the  subjects  of 
the  Tsar  against  the  countrymen  of  Harnack 
and  Eucken.  One  would  like  to  know,  how- 
ever, since  when  have  the  Germans  taken  up 
this  attitude  ?  They  were  not  so  squeamish 
during  the  '  war  of  emancipation  '  which  gave 
birth  to  modern  Germany.  At  that  time  the 
people  of  Eastern  Prussia  were  anxiously  wait- 
ing for  the  appearance  of  Cossacks,  as  heralds 
of  the  Russian  hosts  who  were  to  emancipate 
them  from  the  yoke  of  Napoleon.  Did  the 
Prussians  and  Austrians  reflect  on  the  humilia- 
tion of  an  alliance  with  the  Muscovites,  and 
on  the  superiority  of  the  Code  Civil,  when  the 
Russian  Guard  at  Kulm  x  stood  like  a  rock 
against  the  desperate  onslaught  of  Vandamme  ? 
Perhaps  by  this  time  the  inhabitants  of  Berlin 

1  Kulm.  After  the  defeat  of  the  Allies  by  Napoleon  at  Dresden 
in  1813,  the  French  corps  of  Vandamme  appeared  in  their  rear. 
If  it  had  succeeded  in  cutting  the  line  of  communications  with 
Prague,  the  retreat  of  the  Allies  might  have  been  turned  into  a 
rout.  The  First  Division  of  the  Russian  Cuiard  was  ordered  to  stop 
Vandamme.  and  this  it  did  at  Kulm  on  August  29,  although  it  was 
outnumbered  by  three  to  one  and  lost  almost  half  its  men  in  killed 
and  wounded.  On  the  next  day,  Prussian  and  Austrian  troops 
came  up,  and  Vandamme  surrendered  with  the  remainder  of  hi6 
corps.  The  battle  was  the  turning-point  in  the  campaign  of  1813. 
The  King  of  Prussia  granted  the  Iron  Cross  to  all  those  who  took 
part  in  this  desperate  struggle ;  hence  the  Iron  Cross  was  called 
the  '  Kulm  Cross '  by  the  Russians. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION    31 

have  obliterated  the  bas-relief  in  the  '  Alley 
of  Victories  '  which  represents  Prince  William 
of  Prussia,  the  future  victor  of  Sedan,  seeking 
safety  within  the  square  of  the  Kaluga  regi- 
ment !  1  Russian  blood  has  flowed  in  number- 
less battles  in  the  cause  of  the  Germans  and 
Austrians.  The  present  Armageddon  might 
perhaps  have  been  avoided  if  the  Tsar  Nicholas  i. 
had  left  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  to  its  own 
resources  in  1849,  and  had  not  unwisely  crushed 
the  independence  of  Hungary.  Within  our 
own  memory,  the  benevolent  neutrality  of 
Russia  guarded  Germany  in  1870  from  an 
attack  in  the  rear  by  its  opponents  of  Sadowa. 
Are  all  such  facts  to  be  explained  away  on  the 
ground  that  the  despised  Muscovites  may  be 
occasionally  useful  as  '  gun-meat,'  but  are 
guilty  of  sacrilege  if  they  take  up  a  stand 
against  German  taskmasters  in  '  shinincr 
armour  '  ?  The  older  generations  of  Germany 
had  not  yet  reached  that  comfortable  conclu- 
sion. The  last  recommendation  which  the 
founder  of  the  German  Empire  made  on  his 

1  Prince  William  of  Prussia  and  the  Kaluga  regiment.  The 
future  conqueror  of  Sedan  first  fought  as  a  boy  of  seventeen  at 
Bar-sur-Aube  (February  27,  1814).  In  that  battle  he  joined  the 
Russian  Fifth  Infantry  (Kaluga),  a  regiment  of  which  he  after- 
wards became  an  honorary  colonel. 


32  RUSSIA 

death-bed  to  his  grandson  was  to  keep  on  good 
terms  with  that  Russia  which  is  now  proclaimed 
to  be  a  debased  mixture  of  Byzantine,  Tartar, 
and  Muscovite  abominations. 

Fortunately,  the  course  of  history  does  not 
depend  on  the  frantic  exaggerations  of  partisans. 
The  world  is  not  a  class-room  in  which  docile 
nations  are  distributed  according  to  the  arbi- 
trary standards  of  German  pedagogues.  Europe 
has  admired  the  patriotic  resistance  of  the 
Spanish,  Tyrolese,  and  Russian  peasants  to  the 
enlightened  tyranny  of  Napoleon.  There  are 
other  standards  of  culture  besides  proficiency 
in  research  and  aptitude  for  systematic  work. 
The  massacre  of  Louvain,  the  hideous  brutality 
of  the  Germans  towards  non-combatants — to 
mention  only  one  or  two  of  the  appalling 
occurrences  of  these  last  weeks — have  thrown 
a  lurid  light  on  the  real  character  of  twentieth- 
century  German  culture.  '  By  their  fruits  ye 
shall  know  them,'  said  our  Lord ;  and  the 
saying  which  He  aimed  at  the  Scribes  and 
Pharisees  of  His  time  is  indeed  applicable  to 
the  proud  votaries  of  German  civilisation  to- 
day. Nobody  wishes  to  underestimate  the 
services  rendered  by  the  German  people  to  the 
cause  of  European  progress  ;    but  those  who 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION     33 

have  known  Germany  during  the  years  follow- 
ing the  achievements  of  1870,  have  watched 
with  dismay  the  growth  of  that  arrogant 
conceit  which  the  Greeks  called  vfipis.  The 
cold-blooded  barbarity  advocated  by  Bern- 
hardt the  cynical  view  taken  of  international 
treaties  and  of  the  obligations  of  honour  by  the 
German  Chancellor — these  things  reveal  a  spirit 
which  it  would  be  difficult  indeed  to  describe 
as  a  sign  of  progress. 

One  of  the  effects  of  such  a  frame  of  mind  is 
to  strike  the  victim  of  it  with  blindness.  This 
symptom  has  been  manifest  in  the  stupendous 
blunders  of  German  diplomacy.  The  succes- 
sors of  Bismarck  have  alienated  their  natural 
allies,  such  as  Italy  and  Roumania,  and  have 
driven  England  into  this  war  against  the  evi- 
dent intentions  of  English  Radicals.  But  the 
Germans  have  misconceived  even  more  im- 
portant things.  They  set  out  on  their  adven- 
ture in  the  belief  that  England  would  be 
embarrassed  by  civil  war  and  unable  to  take 
any  effective  part  in  the  fray  ;  and  they  had 
to  learn  something  which  all  their  writers  had 
not  taught  them — that  there  is  a  nation's 
spirit  watching  over  England's  safety  and 
greatness,   a   spirit   at   whose   mighty  call  all 


34  RUSSIA 

party  differences  and  racial  strifes  fade  into 
insignificance.  In  the  same  way,  they  had 
reckoned  on  the  unpreparedness  of  Russia,  in 
consequence  of  internal  dissensions  and  admini- 
strative weakness,  without  taking  heed  of  the 
love  of  all  Russians  for  Russia,  of  their  devo- 
tion to  the  long-suffering  giant  whose  life  is 
throbbing  in  their  veins.  The  Germans  ex- 
pected to  encounter  raw  and  sluggish  troops, 
under  intriguing  time-servers  and  military 
Hamlets,  whose  '  native  hue  of  resolution '  had 
been  '  sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought.' 
Instead  of  that,  they  were  confronted  with 
soldiers  of  the  same  type  as  those  whom 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon  admired, 
led  at  last  by  chiefs  worthy  of  their  men.  And 
behind  these  soldiers  they  discovered  a  nation. 
Do  they  realise  now  what  a  force  they  have 
awakened  ?  Do  they  understand  that  a 
steadfast,  indomitable  resolution,  despising  all 
theatrical  display,  is  moving  Russia's  hosts  ? 
Even  if  the  Russian  generals  had  proved 
mediocre,  even  if  many  disappointing  days  had 
been  in  store,  the  nation  would  not  have  belied 
its  history.  It  has  seen  more  than  one  con- 
quering army  go  down  before  it.  The  Tartars 
and  the  Poles,  the  Swedes  of  Charles  xn.,  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION     35 

Prussians  of  Frederick  the  Great,  the  Grand 
Army  of  Napoleon,  were  not  less  formidable 
than  the  Kaiser's  array,  but  the  task  of  master- 
ing a  united  Russia  proved  too  much  for  each 
one  of  them.  The  Germans  counted  on  the 
fratricidal  feud  between  Poles  and  Russians, 
on  the  resentment  of  the  Jews,  on  Mohammedan 
sympathies  with  Turkey,  and  so  forth.  They 
had  to  learn  too  late  that  the  Jews  had  rallied 
round  the  country  of  their  hearths,  and  that 
the  best  of  them  cannot  believe  that  Russia 
will  continue  to  deny  them  the  measure  of 
justice  and  humanity  which  the  leaders  of 
Russian  thought  have  long  acknowledged 
to  be  due  to  them.  More  important  still, 
the  Germans  have  read  the  Grand  Duke's 
appeal  to  the  Poles,  and  must  have  heard  of 
the  manner  in  which  it  was  received  in  Poland, 
of  the  enthusiastic  support  offered  to  the 
Russian  cause.  If  nothing  else  came  of  this 
great  historical  upheaval  but  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  Russians  and  their  noble  kinsmen 
the  Poles,  the  sacrifices  which  this  crisis 
demands  would  not  be  too  great  a  price  to  pay 
for  the  result. 

But  the   hour  of  trial   has   revealed   other 
things.     It  has  appealed  to  the  best  feelings 


36  RUSSIA 

and  the  best  elements  of  the  Russian  nation. 
It  has  brought  out  in  a  striking  manner  the 
fundamental  tendency  of  Russian  political 
life  and  the  essence  of  Russian  culture,  which 
so  many  people  have  been  unable  to  perceive 
on  account  of  the  chaff  on  the  surface.  Russia 
has  been  going  through  a  painful  crisis.  In 
the  words  of  the  Manifesto  of  October  17-30, 
1905,  the  outward  casing  of  her  administra- 
tion had  become  too  narrow  and  oppressive 
for  the  development  of  society  with  its  growing 
needs,  its  altered  perceptions  of  rights  and 
duties,  its  changed  relations  between  govern- 
ment and  people.  The  result  was  that  deep- 
seated  political  malaise  which  made  itself  felt 
during  the  Japanese  War,  when  Russian  society 
at  large  refused  to  take  any  interest  in  the  fate 
of  the  army  ;  the  feverish  rush  for  '  liberties  ' 
after  the  defeat ;  the  subsequent  reign  of  re- 
action and  repression,  which  has  cast  such  a 
gloom  over  Russian  life  during  these  last  years. 
But  the  effort  of  the  national  struggle  has 
dwarfed  all  these  misunderstandings  and  mis- 
fortunes, as  in  Great  Britain  the  call  of  the 
common  Motherland  has  dwarfed  the  dispute 
between  Unionists  and  Home  Rulers.  Russian 
parties  have  not  renounced  their  aspirations  ; 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION    37 

Russian  Liberals  in  particular  believe  in  self- 
government  and  the  rule  of  law  as  firmly  as 
ever.     But  they  have  realised  as  one  man  that 
this  war  is  not  an  adventure  engineered  by  un- 
scrupulous ambition,   but  a  decisive  struggle 
for  independence  and  existence  ;    and  they  are 
glad  to  be  arrayed  in  close  ranks  with  their 
opponents    from    the    Conservative    side.     A 
friend,  a  Liberal  like  myself,  writes  to  me  from 
Moscow  :    '  It  is  a  great,  unforgettable  time  ; 
we  are  happy  to  be  all  at  one  !  '     And  from 
the  ranks  of  the  most  unfortunate  of  Russia's 
children,  from  the  haunts  of  the  political  exiles 
in  Paris,  comes  the  news  that  Bourtzeff,  one 
of   the    most    prominent    among    the    revolu- 
tionary leaders,   has  addressed  an   appeal  to 
his  comrades  urging  them  to  stand  by  their 
country  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.1 

I  may  add  that  whatever  may  have  been  the 
shortcomings  and  the  blunders  of  the  Russian 
government,  it  is  a  blessing  in  this  decisive 
crisis  that  Russians  should  have  a  firmly-knit 
organisation  and  a  traditional  centre  of 
authority  in  the  power  of  the  Tsar.  The 
present  Emperor  stands  as  the  national  leader, 

1  Bourtzeff,  a  prominent  Russian  revolutionary  leader.  I  am  glad 
to  note  that  Bourtzeff  fully  endorses  my  view  in  a  letter  to  the 
Times  (issue  of  September  18,  191-i). 


38  RUSSIA 

not  in  the  histrionic  attitude  of  a  War  Lord, 
but  in  the  quiet  dignity  of  his  office.  He  has 
said  and  done  the  right  thing,  and  his  subjects 
will  follow  him  to  a  man.  We  are  sure  he  will 
remember  in  the  hour  of  victory  the  unstinted 
devotion  and  sacrifices  of  all  the  nationalities 
and  parties  of  his  vast  Empire.  It  is  our  firm 
conviction  that  the  sad  tale  of  reaction  and 
oppression  is  at  an  end  in  Russia,  and  that  our 
country  will  issue  from  this  momentous  crisis 
with  the  insight  and  strength  required  for  the 
constructive  and  progressive  statesmanship  of 
which  it  stands  in  need. 

Apart  from  the  details  of  political  and  social 
reform,  is  the  regeneration  of  Russia  a  boon 
or  a  peril  to  European  civilisation  ?  The 
declamations  of  the  Germans  have  been  as  mis- 
leading in  this  respect  as  in  all  others.  The 
master- works  of  Russian  literature  are  acces- 
sible in  translation  nowadays,  and  the  cheap 
taunts  of  men  like  Bernhardi  recoil  on  their 
own  heads.  A  nation  represented  by  Pushkin, 
Turgeneff,  Tolstoy,  Dostoyevsky  in  literature, 
by  Kramskoy,  Verestchagin,  Repin,  Glinka, 
Moussorgsky,  Tchaikovsky  in  art,1  by  Mende- 

1  Kramskoy,  Verestchagin,  Repin,  etc.  Only  a  few  names  are 
selected,  almost  at  random.  Of  course,  no  description  of  pictures 
and  no  characterisation  of  painters  can  convey  any  adequate  im- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION     39 

leeff,  Metchnikoff,  Pavloff  in  science,  by  Kluch- 
evsky  and  Solovieff  in  history,  need  not  be 
ashamed  to  enter  the  lists  in  an  international 
competition  for  the  prizes  of  culture.  But  the 
German  historians  ought  to  have  taught  their 
pupils  that  in  the  world  of  ideas  it  is  not  such 
competitions  that  are  important.  A  nation 
handicapped  by  its  geography  may  have  to 
start  later  in  the  field,  and  yet  her  performance 
may  be  relatively  better  than  that  of  her  more 
favoured  neighbours.  It  is  astonishing  to  read 
German  diatribes  about  Russian  backwardness 
when  one  remembers  that  as  recently  as  fifty 
years  ago  Austria  and  Prussia  were  living  under 
a  regime  which  can  hardly  be  considered  more 
enlightened  than  the  present  rule  in  Russia. 
The  Italians  in  Lombardy  and  Venice  have 
still  a  vivid  recollection  of  Austrian  gaols  ;  and 
as  for  Prussian  militarism,  one  need  not  go 
further  than  the  exploits  of  the  Zabern  garri- 
son to  illustrate  its  meaning.  This  being  so, 
it  is  not  particularly  to  be  wondered  at  that  the 
Eastern  neighbour  of  Austria  and  Prussia  has 
followed  to  some  extent  on  the  same  lines. 

But  the  general  direction  of  Russia's  evolu- 

pression.  Those  who  wish  to  form  an  opinion  of  Russian  painting 
should  go  to  Moscow  and  pay  a  visit  to  the  Tretiakoff  Gallery. 


40  RUSSIA 

tion  is  not  doubtful.  Western  students  of  her 
history  might  do  well,  instead  of  sedulously 
collecting  damaging  evidence,  to  pay  some  atten- 
tion to  the  building-up  of  Russia's  universities, 
the  persistent  efforts  of  the  zemstvos,  the  inde- 
pendence and  the  zeal  of  the  Press.  German 
scholars  should  read  Herzen's  vivid  descrip- 
tion of  the  '  idealists  of  the  'forties.'  *  And 
what  about  the  history  of  the  emancipation 
of  the  serfs,  or  of  the  regeneration  of  the 
judicature  ?  The  '  reforms  of  the  'sixties  '  2  are 
a  household  word  in  Russia,  and  surely  they 
are  one  of  the  noblest  efforts  ever  made  by  a 
nation  in  the  direction  of  moral  improvement. 

1  The  idealists  of  the  'forties.  They  have  heen  described  by 
Herzen  in  his  Bylor  i  Dumy  (Past  and  Thoughts)  in  connection 
with  intellectual  life  in  Moscow.  Both  Westerners  like  Granovsky, 
Stankevitch,  Ketscher,  Herzen  himself,  and  Slavophiles  like 
J.  Kireievsky  and  Chomiakoff,  are  vividly  characterised  in  this 
brilliant  autobiography. 

2  The  reforms  of  the  'sixties.  They  comprise  the  great  reforms 
carried  out  with  rare  patriotism  and  insight  during  the  early  years 
of  Alexander  n.'s  reign.  The  principal  were— the  emancipation  of 
the  peasants  (1861),  the  reorganisation  of  the  judicial  system  (1864), 
and  the  creation  of  zenutvo  self-government  (1864).  There  was 
a  number  of  other  reforms  besides — the  University  Statutes  of 
1863,  the  Press  Law  of  1865,  the  partial  abolition  of  corporal 
punishment  in  1868;  and  so  forth.  Many  of  these  reforms  have 
been  adulterated  by  subsequent  modifications ;  but  the  main 
current  of  progress  could  not  be  turned  back,  and  there  are  no 
greater  names  in  the  history  of  Europe  than  those  of  N.  Milutine, 
D.  Milutine,  Prince  Cherkassky,  J.  Samarine,  Unkovsky,  Zarudny, 
and  their  companions. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION     41 

Looking  somewhat  deeper,  what  right  have 
the  Germans  to  speak  of  their  ideals  of  culture 
as  superior  to  those  of  the  Russian  people  ? 
They  deride  the  superstitions  of  the  mujikh  as 
if  tapers  and  genuflexions  were  the  principal 
matters  of  popular  religion.  Those  who  have 
studied  the  Russian  people  without  prejudice 
know  better  than  that.  Read  Selma  Lager- 
loefs  touching  description  of  Russian  pilgrims 
in  Palestine.1  She,  the  Protestant,  has  under- 
stood the  true  significance  of  the  religious 
impulse  which  leads  these  poor  men  to  the 
Holy  Land,  and  which  draws  them  to  the 
numberless  churches  of  the  vast  country. 
These  simple  people  cling  to  the  belief  that 
there  is  something  else  in  God's  wrorld  besides 
toil  and  greed  ;  they  flock  towards  the  light, 
and  find  in  it  the  justification  of  their  human 
craving  for  peace  and  mercy.  For  the  Russian 
people  have  the  Christian  virtue  of  patience 
in  suffering  :  their  pity  for  the  poor  and 
oppressed  is  more  than  an  occasional  mani- 
festation of  individual  feeling — it  is  deeply 
rooted  in  national  psychology.  This  frame  of 
mind  has  been  scorned  as  fit  for  slaves  !     It  is 

1  Selma  Lagerloef  on  Russian  pilgrims. — '  Jerusalem/  vol.  ii.,  'On 
the  Wings  of  the  Dawn.' 


42  RUSSIA 

indeed  a  case  where  the  learning  of  philosophers 
is  put  to  shame  by  the  insight  of  the  simple- 
minded.  Conquerors  should  remember  that 
the  greatest  victories  in  history  have  been  won 
by  the  unarmed — by  the  Christian  confessors 
whom  the  emperors  sent  to  the  lions,  by  the 
'  old  believers  '  of  Russia  who  went  to  Siberia 
and  to  the  flames  for  their  unyielding  faith,  by 
the  Russian  serfs  who  preserved  their  human 
dignity  and  social  cohesion  in  spite  of  the  ex- 
actions of  their  masters,  by  the  Italians,  Poles, 
and  Jews,  when  they  were  trampled  under 
foot  by  their  rulers.  It  is  such  a  victory  of 
the  spirit  that  Tolstoy  had  in  mind  when  he 
preached  his  gospel  of  non-resistance  ;  and  I 
do  not  think  even  a  German  on  the  war-path 
would  be  blind  enough  to  suppose  that  Tolstoy's 
message  came  from  a  craven  soul.  The  orien- 
tation of  the  so-called  '  intelligent  '  class  in 
Russia — that  is,  the  educated  middle  class, 
which  is  much  more  numerous  and  influential 
than  people  suppose — is  somewhat  different, 
of  course.  It  is  '  Western  '  in  this  sense,  that 
it  is  imbued  with  current  European  ideas  as 
to  politics,  economics,  and  law.  It  has  to  a 
certain  extent  lost  the  simple  faith  and  reli- 
gious   fervour    of   the    peasants.     But    it   has 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  A  NATION     43 

faithfully  preserved  the  keynote  of  popular 
ideals.  It  is  still  characteristically  humani- 
tarian in  its  view  of  the  world  and  in  its  aims. 
A  book  like  that  of  General  von  Bernhardi 
would  be  impossible  in  Russia.  If  anybody 
were  to  publish  it,  it  would  not  only  fall  flat, 
but  earn  for  its  author  the  reputation  of  a 
bloodhound.  Many  deeds  of  cruelty  and 
brutality  happen,  of  course,  in  Russia,  but  no 
writer  of  any  standing  would  dream  of  build- 
ing up  a  theory  of  violence  in  vindication  of  a 
claim  to  culture.  It  may  be  said,  in  fact,  that 
the  leaders  of  Russian  public  opinion  are 
pacific,  cosmopolitan,  and  humanitarian  to  a 
fault.  The  mystic  philosopher,  Vladimir  Solo- 
vieff,1  used  to  dream  of  the  union  of  the  churches 
with  the  Pope  as  the  spiritual  head,  and 
democracy  in  the  Russian  sense  as  the  broad 
basis  of  the  rejuvenated  Christendom.  Dos- 
toyevsky,  a  writer  most  sensitive  to  the  claims 
of  nationality  in  Russia,  defined  the  ideal  of 
the  Russians  in  a  celebrated  speech  as  the  em 
bodiment  of  a  universally  humanitarian  type. 

1  Vladimir  Solovieff.  A  talented  philosopher,  the  son  of  the 
famous  historian  S.  Solovieff.  He  was  professor  at  Moscow  for 
a  short  time. 

2  Dostoyevsky  s  speech.  It  was  delivered  in  Moscow  in  1880,  on 
the  occasion  of  the  unveiling  of  Pushkin's  statue  in  that  city. 


44  RUSSIA 

These  are  extremes,  but  characteristic  ex- 
tremes pointing  to  the  trend  of  national 
thought.  Russia  is  so  huge  and  so  strong,  that 
material  power  has  ceased  to  be  attractive  to 
her  thinkers.  Nevertheless,  we  need  not  yet 
retire  into  the  desert  or  deliver  ourselves  to  be 
bound  hand  and  foot  by  '  civilised  '  Germans. 
Russia  also  wields  a  sword — a  charmed  sword, 
blunt  in  an  unrighteous  cause,  but  sharp 
enough  in  the  defence  of  right  and  freedom. 
And  this  war  is  indeed  our  Befreiungskrieg. 
The  Slavs  must  have  their  chance  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  and  the  date  of  their 
coining  of  age  will  mark  a  new  departure  in 
the  growth  of  civilisation. 


Printed  by  T.  and  A.  Constable,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 
at  the  Edinburgh  University  Press 


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